Abstract. The concept of proxy signature was introduced by Mambo et al. to delegate signing capability in the digital world. In this paper, we show that three existing proxy signature schemes without certificates, namely, the Qian and Cao identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) scheme, the Guo et al. IBPS scheme and the Li et al. certificateless proxy signature (CLPS) scheme are insecure against universal forgery. More precisely, we show that any user who has a valid public-private key pair can act as a cheating proxy signer and forge the proxy signature on behalf of the original signer at will, without obtaining the official delegation from the original signer.
Introduction
Proxy Signature and Its Applications. The concept of proxy signature was first introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in [18] . A proxy signature scheme involved three entities, namely, the original signer, the proxy signer and the verifier [28] . A proxy signature scheme allows a designated signer called a proxy signer to sign the message on behalf of an original signer. A proxy signature convinces the verifier that the signature is signed by the proxy signer who gets the delegation right from the original signer. Proxy signatures have found various practical applications, particularly in distributed computing where delegation of rights is common. Examples include e-cash systems [19] , global distribution network [2] , grid computing [7] and mobile agent applications [15, 16] , to name a few. To illuminate how to use proxy signatures, we give more explanations on the delegating signing capabilities within organization [29] . If a manager of an organization is on leave, he has to delegate to his assistant manager the capability to sign on behalf of him.
Natural Constructions of Proxy Signature. Proxy signature can be constructed in several ways as stated in [18, 14, 23, 25, 3] , according to the delegation type:
1. Full Delegation: The most straightforward solution is for the original signer to give its private key to the proxy signer, who can then use it to sign any messages on behalf of the original signer. 2. Partial Delegation: In a partial delegation scheme, a proxy signer has a new key called proxy signing key, which is different from the original signer's private key. The proxy signing key is generated by both the original signer and the proxy signer. 3. Delegation by Certificate/Warrant: In delegation by warrant, the original signer uses its private key and the signing algorithm of a standard signature to sign a warrant, which contains information regarding the particular proxy signer. After receiving the warrant, the proxy signer uses its private key and the signing algorithm of a standard signature to sign messages on behalf of the original signer. 4. Partial Delegation with Warrant: Kim et al. [14] proposed a partial delegation with warrant proxy signature scheme which enjoys the computational and bandwidth advantages over the proxy signature by warrant and the structure advantage over the proxy signature for partial delegation.
Public Key Cryptography without Certificates. Traditional public key cryptography (TPKC) was introduced by Diffie and Hellman [6] to solve the key distribution problem suffered in symmetric key cryptography. As opposed to the symmetric key cryptography, TPKC involves the use of two different keys, namely a public key and a private key, which are mathematically related to each other. However, TPKC requires the use of certificate in authenticating the public key, which leads to certificate revocation problems. Thus, the design of a secure and efficient cryptographic scheme without certificate becomes the goal of many cryptographers nowadays. Two types of public key cryptography without certificates in focus are identity-based cryptography (IBC) and certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC). The concept of IBC was formulated by Shamir [22] to achieve implicit certification. Shamir's original motivation was to simplify certificate management in email systems. In IBC, the public key is effectively replaced by the user's publicly available identity information or any arbitrary string which derived from the user identity (ID), thus certificate can be omitted. However, since all the private keys of the users are generated by a trusted third party (TTP) called private key generator (PKG), the private key escrow problem is inherent in the system. CLPKC [1] is a paradigm which eliminates the usage of certificates in TPKC while solving the inherent key escrow problem in IBC. CLPKC can be seen as a model that is intermediate between TPKC and IBC. In this new paradigm, the user public key is no longer any arbitrary string that identifies the user, rather, it is similar with the public key used in TPKC. The user private key is computed by using both the partial private key, a key generated by a TTP called Key Generation Centre (KGC), and the user secret value.
Our Contributions. Most of the proxy signature schemes were proposed in the public key infrastructure (PKI) setting. Recently, several proxy signature schemes adapted to IBC [28, 5, 21, 26, 24, 11, 10] and CLPKC [17] have also been proposed.
In this paper, we review three existing partial delegation with warrant proxy signature schemes without certificates, namely, the Qian and Cao identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) scheme [21] , the Guo et al. IBPS [11] scheme and the Li et al. certificateless proxy signature (CLPS) scheme. These three schemes were derived from the provably secure identity-based signature (IBS) schemes [22, 4, 12] . The Qian and Cao IBPS scheme is RSA-based. RSA-based schemes are preferable since it is quite common that companies may have invested in expensive hardware and software implementations of RSA. Meanwhile, the Guo et al. IBPS scheme and the Li et al. CLPS scheme are constructed by using bilinear pairings, which is an important tool in constructing identity-based and certificateless scheme.
We show that these three schemes did not satisfy the basic security requirement of proxy signature in the ID-based setting and the certificateless setting. More precisely, we show that any user who has a valid public-private key pair can act as a cheating proxy signer and forge the proxy signature on behalf of the original signer at will, without obtaining the official delegation from the original signer.
Preliminaries
We review the properties of bilinear pairings below. Bilinear Pairings: Let (G 1 , •) and (G 2 , •) denote two cyclic groups of prime order q (• denotes a binary operation). A bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 satisfies the following properties:
R)e(Q, R) and e(P, Q • R) = e(P, Q)e(P, R). Thus, for any a, b ∈ Z *
q , e(aP, bP ) = e(bP, aP ) = e(P, P ) ab . 2. Non-degeneracy: e(P, Q) = 1 G2 where 1 G2 is the identity element of G 2 . 3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Cryptanalysis of the Qian and Cao IBPS Scheme
Recently, Qian and Cao proposed an IBPS scheme [21] which was derived from the Shamir IBS scheme [22] . They also proved the Shamir IBS scheme secure against adaptive chosen message attack (CMA) [8] based on the RSA assumption in the same paper. In this section, we first review the IBPS scheme proposed by Qian and Cao. We then show that this IBPS scheme is universally forgeable.
The Qian and Cao IBPS Scheme
The Qian and Cao IBPS scheme [21] is defined by the following algorithms: In [21] , Qian and Cao showed that the Shamir IBS scheme cannot resist the blinding attack as they claimed that the user private key is the common RSA signature. The forger can pick a random t ∈ Z n and set ID 0 = t e · ID mod n. The forger then requests the signature from the signer who is willing to sign on ID 0 . The forger now simply computes S = S 0 · t −1 mod n where S and S 0 are respectively the signature for ID and ID 0 on message m. Qian and Cao thereby proposed an improved Shamir IBS scheme by setting the private key
d . We note that this improvement had been recommended by Shamir earlier in [22] .
Attack on the Qian and Cao IBPS Scheme
Now, we show that the Qian and Cao IBPS scheme is vulnerable to the forgery attack. This strong attack is the universal forgery against no message attack where no signing oracle is required in the adversarial model. To be more precise, any user who has a valid public-private key pair can act as a cheating proxy signer (which is also considered as a forger here), to sign any message at will on behalf of the original signer, without obtaining any official delegation from the original signer. We describe the efficient algorithm that enables the forger to sign any message on behalf of the original signer. Let A denote the original signer while B denote the cheating proxy signer.
Proxy Signature Generation: To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1} n , the cheating proxy signer (the forger) who has his own private key D IDB performs the following steps: 
The forged proxy signature on message m signed by the cheating proxy signer B on behalf of the original signer A is valid since the verification step is true for the forged proxy signature as follows:
If not, rejects the signature. 
where r e B = R B · Q IDA .
The Qian and Cao IBPS scheme is therefore insecure against the universal forgery since the forger can sign any message he wants on behalf of any original signer.
Cryptanalysis of the Guo et al. IBPS Scheme
We first review the IBPS schemes proposed by Guo et al. [11] which was derived from the Cha and Cheon IBS scheme [4] . In [27] , Yoon et al. showed that the Cha and Cheon IBS scheme cannot be used in constructing a provably secure identity-based aggregate signature scheme if no further modification is made. In this section, we show that the Guo et al. IBPS scheme is insecure against the universal forgery by using the similar approach as in Yoon et al.
The Guo et al. IBPS Scheme
The Guo et al. IBPS scheme [11] is defined by the following algorithms:
1. Setup: The PKG first chooses a security parameter k, it then chooses two groups G 1 and G 2 of the same large prime order q(|q| = k), a generator P ∈ G 1 and also a bilinear map e :
Two one way functions are also necessary:
At last, the PKG chooses s ∈ Z * q as the system master key which is known only by itself. The PKG then computes P pub = sP as the system public key and publicizes the system parameters params = {G 1 , G 2 , e, q, k, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 }.
Extract: The user submits his ID ∈ {0, 1}
* to the PKG, the PKG then computes the user private key D ID = sQ ID , where Q ID = H 1 (ID). The user private key must be transmitted to the user through a secure channel. The original signer Alice has her public-private key pair as (Q IDA , D IDA ), and the proxy signer Bob has his public-private key pair as (Q IDB , D IDB ). 3. Proxy Key Generation: To delegate the signing ability to the proxy signer, the original signer Alice first makes a warrant m w , which consists of the original signer ID, the proxy signer ID, the delegation period T , the proxy signature scope, etc. Then, Alice performs some computations as follows: (a) Choose x A ∈ Z * q at random and compute
At last, Alice sends (X IDA , S, r) and m w to Bob. When Bob receives the warrant m w and (X IDA , S, r) from Alice, he also makes some computations to check if the triple consists of the original signer's authority. Bob firstly computes:
Then, he computes r = H 2 (m w ||T ||X IDA ), only if the equations r = r and T = e(X IDA , P pub ) are satisfied, so that Bob can confirm that he has got the original signer's authority. The proxy signature key is the combination of (D IDB , S). (X IDA , U, V, m w , m) will be accepted, otherwise it will be rejected.
Attack on the Guo et al. IBPS Scheme
Now, we show that the Guo et al. IBPS scheme is vulnerable to the forgery attack by using the same approach as in Yoon et al. Similar to our previous attack mounted on the Qian and Cao IBPS scheme, this strong attack is again the universal forgery against no message attack where no signing oracle is required in the adversarial model. More precisely, any user who has a valid public-private key pair can act as a cheating proxy signer (which is also considered as a forger here), to sign any message at will on behalf of the original signer, without obtaining any official delegation from the original signer. We describe the efficient algorithm used to sign any message on behalf of the original signer below. Let A denote the original signer while B denote the cheating proxy signer.
Proxy Signature Generation: To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1} n , the cheating proxy signer (the forger) who has his own private key D IDB performs the following steps: The forged proxy signature on message m signed by the cheating proxy signer B on behalf of the original signer A is valid since the verification step is true for the forged proxy signature as follows:
, where m w is the warrant. 3. Compute h = H 2 (m||m w ||U ), where m w is the warrant and m is the message to be signed. 4. Accept the proxy signature if e(P, V ) = e(P pub , X IDA − r Q IDA + U + h Q IDB ).
where r = r and h = h.
Thus, the Guo et al. IBPS scheme is insecure against the universal forgery since the forger can sign any message at will on behalf of any original signer without the cooperation of the original signer at all.
Cryptanalysis of the Li et al. CLPS Scheme
The Li et al. CLPS scheme [17] was derived from the Cha and Cheon IBS scheme [4] and the Hess IBS scheme [12] . It is the only CLPS scheme in the literature.
The Li et al. CLPS Scheme
The Li et al. CLPS scheme [17] is defined by the following algorithms:
1. Setup: Given a security parameter k ∈ Z + , the algorithm works as follows: (a) Generate the groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q and a pairing e : Sign: To sign a message m and a warrant m w on identities ID A and ID B , the Type I adversary performs the following steps:
1. Select a random U, S ∈ G 1 and compute The public key of ID B is different from the public key of ID A since a random r is included.
Conclusion
We mounted some attacks on three proxy signature schemes without certificates, they are the Qian and Cao IBPS scheme, the Guo et al. IBPS scheme and the Li et al. CLPS scheme. From the above security analyses, we may conclude that the security of a proxy signature scheme deriving from a signature scheme is not guaranteed even though the underlying signature scheme is provably secure. Thus, extra caution must be exercised in extracting this kind of scheme.
